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EXCLUSIONARY EQUALITY AND THE  
CASE FOR SAME-SEX FAMILIES:  
A Reworking of Martha Fineman’s  
Re-visioned Family Law 
Zachary A. Kramer1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many years now, scholars, activists, and even the general public have 
debated the legal issues related to same-sex families.2  This debate, while 
ostensibly academic, has become far more acute in the wake of a handful of 
groundbreaking court decisions.  The first of these cases is the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.3   In Lawrence, the Court 
struck down Texas’s criminal sodomy law and overruled its decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,4 which sustained Georgia’s anti-sodomy law and 
denied homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in same-sex sodomy.5  
Following close on Lawrence’s heels were the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s two same-sex marriage opinions, where, taken together, the 
court determined that the state must confer gays and lesbians6 the same 
marital rights that heterosexuals possess,7 and that only full-scale civil 
marriage rights, not civil unions, would suffice under this standard.8  In 
spite of these substantial victories, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit handed gays and lesbians a devastating loss by 
upholding the constitutionality of a Florida law prohibiting homosexuals 
from adopting children.9   
These four opinions, however, do not mark the end of the debate over 
same-sex families.  Instead, they suggest a new beginning for the gay rights 
movement, one with extremely heightened stakes.  For instance, shortly 
after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s 
marriage laws must be open with equal force to same-sex couples, those 
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who oppose same-sex marriage floated the idea of a federal constitutional 
amendment that would define marriage as a heterosexual union.10  President 
Bush expressed support for such an amendment in his State of the Union 
Address on January 20, 2004.11  Soon thereafter, the Massachusetts 
legislature began considering a similar amendment to its own constitution.12  
This area of the law is in constant flux, which suggests that much may 
change regarding same-sex families by the time this article goes to print.  
These recent developments do not, however, nullify the general debate over 
same-sex families.  Because there is still a great deal of room to advocate 
for same-sex families, this article addresess the larger, more theoretical 
question of how advocates can frame their arguments in support of same-
sex families.13  In addressing this question, this article puts forth one such 
argument.14 
As the debate over same-sex families has unfolded, numerous scholars 
have articulated a variety of arguments directed at either supporting or 
opposing same-sex marriage and adoption.15  Regardless of their breadth, 
such discussions can never be exhaustive.  With that in mind, this article 
seeks to add another dimension to the debate by reworking Martha 
Fineman’s “Re-visioned Family Law” theory to enhance and support the 
case for same-sex families.  Professor Martha Fineman is both a highly 
regarded feminist theorist and an expert in family law.  Although Fineman 
does not normally write on issues involving gay and lesbian families, her 
work is nevertheless applicable to the issues of same-sex marriage and 
parenting.   
This article utilizes Fineman’s re-visioned family law to show how 
advocates for same-sex families can formulate an original argument in favor 
of same-sex families.  The thrust of Fineman’s theory is that the state 
should abolish legal marriage and replace it with legal protection for 
caregiving units, primarily those comprised of parent and child.  I will use 
this general theory not only to demonstrate why gays and lesbians could 
champion it,16 but also to discuss a larger theoretical construct that I have 
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termed  “exclusionary equality.”  The thrust of the exclusionary equality 
concept is that gays and lesbians can articulate positions in support of 
homosexual rights by arguing that no one, gay or straight, should be entitled 
to the rights in question.  Thus, the exclusionary equality model renders 
gays and straights equal not because they both can exercise the rights 
associated with legal marriage, but because neither can.  Those rights would 
simply no longer exist.17  
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts.  Part II contains both 
objective and subjective sections.  It begins objectively by briefly 
introducing Martha Fineman and providing a general description of her 
work.18 This introduction is all the more relevant here because Fineman’s 
work is rarely discussed in the context of gay and lesbian relationships and 
families.  From there, Part II presents Fineman’s theory, focusing primarily 
on the Mother/Child Dyad and the role of contract law as a replacement for 
legal marriage.19  The third and final section in Part II—the subjective 
part—presents a brief criticism of Fineman’s theory—namely, that the 
hetero-centricity of Fineman’s theory is harmful to gays and lesbians and 
therefore frustrates the interests of same-sex families.20  
Part III reworks Fineman’s model so that it addresses two of the main 
issues facing same-sex families: marriage and parenting.21  Clearly, such a 
discussion is important, considering that gay and lesbian marriage and 
adoption have, in recent years, become particularly divisive legal issues.  
Building on this argument, Part IV relates my analysis—that is, my 
reworking of Fineman’s theory—to the larger debate surrounding same-sex 
families.  To explore “exclusionary equality,” this part first assesses how 
Fineman’s theory implicitly conceives of equality on an exclusive, rather 
than inclusive, basis.22  Finally, I address two likely counter-arguments to 
this conception of equality.23  These discussions will prove helpful in 
transposing Fineman’s theory to the realm of same-sex families. 
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II.  BACKGROUND:  MARTHA FINEMAN AND HER RE-VISIONED 
FAMILY LAW 
A.  Martha Fineman: An Introduction 
Martha Fineman is currently the Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law 
at Emory Law School.24  Prior to joining Emory, she was the Dorthea S. 
Clarke Professor of Feminist Jurisprudence at Cornell Law School.25  
Before teaching at Cornell, Fineman taught at Columbia University and the 
University of Wisconsin law schools and clerked for U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit.26  Over the years, Fineman’s scholarship has 
focused primarily on family law and feminist jurisprudence.  In these areas, 
Fineman has published eight books (with at least three more forthcoming), 
eleven book chapters, and countless articles, essays, and reviews.27 
This article focuses exclusively on one of Fineman’s books, The 
Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies (The Neutered Mother).  The Neutered Mother is a 
comprehensive book, ranging from discussions of the failings of feminist 
legal philosophy and the history of child custody laws to a criticism of the 
social standing of single mothers.28  The scope of this article, however, is 
limited to one chapter from The Neutered Mother, in which Fineman’s 
presents her re-visioned family law.   
Fineman’s theory is not a gay rights theory per se; it is, rather, a 
traditional feminist theory in that its primary subject is both heterosexual 
and female.29  This is not to say that the fields of feminism and gay rights 
do not overlap, for they surely do; hence, lesbian feminism.30  But I 
bifurcate feminism and gay rights here to emphasize that Fineman’s theory 
implicitly separates them by not extending her discussion to same-sex 
families.  That is, the marriage Fineman speaks of in The Neutered Mother 
is almost exclusively heterosexual marriage, whereas I will focus 
exclusively on same-sex marriage.  Nevertheless, recognizing that the 
schools overlap and are interrelated, I recommend that those advocating for 
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gay and lesbian families study and consider Fineman’s proposed reforms 
advanced in The Neutered Mother.31 
B.  Fineman’s Re-visioned Family Law 
The central purpose of Fineman’s theory is to overcome family law’s 
reliance on what she calls the traditional, idealized family.32  Even though 
American family law has adopted gender-neutral terminology, Fineman 
believes that the law has not actually equalized the sexes and that gendered 
lives continue unaffected by the equality-driven aims of family law.33  
Accordingly, the current family law scheme reinforces the idealized family 
as a social norm by subsidizing the nuclear family, giving idealized families 
tax breaks and various benefits that non-nuclear family units do not 
receive.34  Fineman also believes that because it exalts the idealized family 
unit, family law does not adequately support or encourage people to take on 
the role of familial caretaker.35  Because the law focuses on the sexual 
relationship between a child’s parents, child nurturing does not seem to be 
at the forefront of the state’s concerns.  For obvious reasons, Fineman finds 
this problematic, and she seeks to revise our notion of The Family to avoid 
this trend. 
There are two main components to Fineman’s theory: the abolition of 
legal marriage and the Mother/Child Dyad.  The following two subsections 
will discuss these components, focusing both on the purposes behind the 
proposals and how the proposals will work once implemented.  It is 
important to remember two things when considering Fineman’s theory.  
First, because this is a work of theory, the following discussion may raise 
concerns regarding the practicality of Fineman’s proposals.36  Although 
relevant, such concerns should not be at the forefront of an analysis of 
Fineman’s work.37  As with most theoretical inquiries, it may prove more 
beneficial to first consider the analytical questions raised by the theory 
rather than the practical questions that are sure to arise.38  Second, because 
Fineman’s proposals are interrelated, adopting only one would undermine 
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her theory entirely.   The Dyad construct both requires the abolition of legal 
marriage and acts as its replacement. 
1.  Abolishing Legal Marriage 
The first part of Fineman’s theory calls for the abolition of both the legal 
category of marriage and the subsidized benefits that normally accompany 
such relationships.39  It is imperative to note at the outset that Fineman is 
only referring to the legal significance of marriage.  Although couples 
would still be able to engage in ceremonious and religious marriages (i.e. 
symbolic marriages), those relationships would not have any legal 
significance, and the state would not recognize marital partners in a 
formalized manner.40  Relationships between men and women41 would 
instead be governed by the legal rules that control most other aspects of 
society—namely those of property, contract, criminal, and tort law.42  Of 
these bodies of law, however, contract law would play the most vital role in 
the lives of the men and women who wished to enter into formalized, sexual 
relationships. 
The role of contract law in Fineman’s theory is paramount.43  Fineman’s 
construct enables men and women to negotiate freely the terms of their 
relationships instead of having to rely on the state to create the terms of 
their marriage.44  Abolishing the legal recognition of sexual relationships 
privatizes them by denying states the power to subsidize the ideal, 
romanticized family.45  Moreover, such contracting satisfactorily reflects the 
recent trend in family law.  As Fineman points out, society already 
recognizes the value of prenuptial and antenuptial contractual agreements.  
According to Fineman, “[o]pportunities for individual bargaining about 
economic and other aspects of sexual relations typically now occur at the 
termination of the relationship . . . [this] proposal would merely mandate 
that such bargaining occur prior to the termination of the relationship, 
ideally before the couple becomes too ‘serious.’”46 
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Fineman recognizes two major benefits that would follow from the 
abolition of legal marriage.  First, the state’s interest in bolstering marriage 
and the idealized family form would disappear because all sexual 
relationships would be permitted in this construct, so long as they were 
voluntary and between consenting adults.47  The flip side of this, however, 
is that consenting adults could contract into deviant sexual relationships.48  
This is not much of a concern for Fineman, though, because she believes the 
state should not have an interest in voluntary sexual relationships between 
consenting, contracting adults.   
The second major benefit of the abolition of legal marriage is that it 
would “render indefensible the differential treatment of children based on 
their parents’ marital status.”49  This benefit really concerns Fineman’s 
refocusing the scope of family law, which is the subject of the following 
subsection.  It is worth pointing out, however, that abolishing legal marriage 
directly leads to Fineman’s Mother/Child Dyad.  The abolition of marriage 
and the creation of the Dyad work together to shift the state’s focus from 
the sexual relationship between parents to the child-nurturing relationship 
between caretaker and dependent.   
2.  Mother/Child Dyad 
The Mother/Child Dyad reflects Fineman’s interest in securing legal 
protections for familial nurturing units because the primary concern of the 
Dyad is to protect dependents, whom she refers to as the “weaker” members 
of society.50  With the legal significance of marriage eliminated, Fineman 
theorizes that society would take greater notice of these dependents.  The 
state, in turn, would react to the general social concern regarding these 
dependents, assume responsibility for them, and publicly fund caretaking 
relationships.51  Conceived of as a caregiving unit, the Dyad is the focal 
point for the reallocation of the social and economic subsidies that are 
currently awarded to traditional families.52  Rather than subsidizing marital 
unions, the state would instead subsidize the caretaker-dependent 
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relationship.  The purpose of this reallocation would be to enable families to 
function independently, with the state only concerning itself with familial 
caretaking.53  Fineman’s scheme would require a massive restructuring of 
social roles and institutions; essentially, she proposes revising the ideology 
of family and switching the focus of the law from the traditional family to 
the nature of dependency.  Thus, the obligations imposed on third parties by 
an individual’s marital status would not simply disappear.  These benefits 
and obligations would continue, but the third parties would instead provide 
them based on an individual’s status as a caretaker or dependent, not as a 
married person.   
For example, the revised system would require employers to provide 
health benefits to an employee’s partner if the partner is a caretaker.  More 
specifically, if Mark and Mary decided to have a child, then Mary’s 
employer would provide health benefits to Mark and the child.  This would 
not be required, however, if Mark and Mary did not to have a child because 
the employer would have no legal obligation to provide benefits to a non-
caretaking partner.54  
The role of the “mother” in Fineman’s theory, moreover, is sex-neutral.  
As the above hypothetical suggests, either a man or a woman could be a 
child’s mother.  It is not accidental, however, that Fineman decided to call 
the caretaker  “mother.”  She sees this as a way to reclaim the term.55  
According to Fineman, “[m]otherhood has unrealized power—the power to 
challenge the hold of sexuality on our thinking about intimacy; the power to 
redefine our concept of the family, which may be why men have tried for so 
long to control its meaning.”56  The Dyad wields the power of motherhood 
to help shift the law’s focus to the necessity of nurturing, which Fineman 
believes is contained within the social vision of motherhood.   
Similarly, the theory does not require that a dependent have only one 
mother, nor does it impose a limit on the maximum number of mothers a 
child can have.  The specifics of a particular family’s structure are private; 
the theory does not envision an ideal family.  If a family wishes to have two 
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mothers who will share the caretaker role, then it is free to do so.  All that is 
required is that this relationship is negotiated in the contract.  Moreover, it 
is not required that a child’s parents maintain a sexual relationship if they 
wish to form a Dyad.57  If two friends wish to raise a child together and 
keep the child separate from their respective sexual relationships, they can 
similarly enter into a contract and form their own Dyad.58  The law, in 
Fineman’s framework, simply would not take into account a person’s sexual 
relationships.59 
C.  A Critique 
There are two issues that Fineman does not address in The Neutered 
Mother,60 and both relate to a common criticism: that the hetero-centricity 
of Fineman’s theory renders it incomplete.  First, because Fineman does not 
address the applicability of her theory to same-sex families, her re-visioned 
family law implicitly encourages heterosexism and the compulsory 
heterosexual norm.  Secondly, Fineman’s re-visioned family law does not 
acknowledge the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.   
1.  Heterosexism and Compulsory Heterosexuality 
The focus of The Neutered Mother is narrow, concentrating almost 
exclusively on how family law affects straight women in marital 
relationships.  Because Fineman draws her focus so narrowly, however, her 
re-visioned family law is essentially a heterosexual theory, which reinforces 
cultural heterosexism and the “valorization of heterosexual activity”61 over 
that of homosexuality.  For Fineman, marriage is a harmful institution to 
women because it reinforces traditional sex and gender roles, and because it 
relegates women and motherhood to the iniquitous private sphere.  But this 
view, however poignant it may be, completely passes over the point that 
marriage is likewise a harmful institution to gays and lesbians.  While we 
can all join Fineman in attacking the harmful aspects of heterosexual 
marriage, gays and lesbians and their supporters should highlight that 
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Fineman’s re-visioned family law fails to expressly embrace same-sex 
families despite its obvious relevance to their struggle. 
This criticism comes into full view when one considers the mechanisms 
of heterosexism.  The dynamics of heterosexism dictate that all people 
should be attracted exclusively to members of the opposite sex.62  A 
heterosexist society therefore labels all those who fall outside this model—
for instance, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals—as sexual deviants.  According 
to Sylvia Law, “[t]he pervasive cultural presumption and prescription of 
heterosexual relationships—and the corresponding silencing and 
condemnation of homosexual erotic, familial and communitarian 
relations—can aptly be termed ‘heterosexism.’”63   
Law’s framework relies heavily on what Adrienne Rich calls 
“compulsory heterosexuality,”64 which is best understood as the pervasive 
assumption that all people are heterosexual.  Heterosexism not only 
incorporates the notion of compulsory heterosexuality, but it also exploits 
the compulsory heterosexual norm in the sense that it deems heterosexuality 
as “right” and homosexuality as “wrong.”  This is the essence of 
homophobia and sexual orientation-based discrimination.  Rather than 
mounting a defense to these ills, Fineman’s theory implicitly furthers the 
heterosexist norm. 
Fineman’s failure to explicitly embrace same-sex families reinforces the 
heterosexist model and with it all of heterosexism’s attendant conse-
quences.  Thus, one could—and I believe should—argue that Fineman 
abandoned the homosexual community by focusing exclusively on straight 
women.  Her failure to challenge heterosexuality as an “ideological insti-
tution implicated in women’s oppression”65 harms not only heterosexual 
women, but also lesbians and gay men who are excluded from its privileges 
and protections.66  Furthermore, Fineman champions her re-visioned family 
law on behalf of heterosexual women and mothers; however, her theory 
would be that much more powerful had she further extolled its virtues on 
behalf of the gay and lesbian community. 
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2.  The Conflation of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation 
A second point to consider is that Fineman does not relate her discussion 
of marriage and sexuality to the law’s pervasive conflation of sex, gender, 
and sexual orientation.67  Andrew Koppelman has argued for some time that 
sexual orientation discrimination effectively constitutes a form of sex 
discrimination because it makes sex-based classifications.68  Anyone willing 
to adopt an argument similar to Fineman’s must be prepared to address the 
conflation, inextricability, and interdependence of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation.  In failing to advocate for same-sex relationships, Fineman 
limits the applicability of her theory by ignoring the shared political 
interests of gay and lesbian activists and straight feminists. 
III.  REWORKING FINEMAN’S RE-VISIONED FAMILY LAW 
In developing the Mother/Child Dyad, Fineman sought to undo the 
gender inequalities that pervade modern family law institutions.  Fineman 
promotes a new familial model that is not plagued with the implicit gender 
oppression of the traditional, romanticized family.  Although she describes 
this model in terms of heterosexuality, it is equally applicable to gay and 
lesbian families under the auspices of an equality-based theory.69  In fact, 
Fineman’s reforms could greatly improve the legal standing of gay and 
lesbian families.  By examining the effects of Fineman’s reforms on the 
status of gay and lesbian marriage and adoption, this analysis will 
ultimately conclude that gays and lesbians can utilize Fineman’s reforms.  
Indeed, a reworked version of her re-visioned family law supports, at least 
implicitly, an equality argument in favor of same-sex families. 
A.  The Abolition of Marriage: Paving the Way for Same-Sex Relationships 
Notwithstanding the implications of the recent Massachusetts ruling, gays 
and lesbians cannot enter into a legally binding marriage,70 though some 
states and municipalities offer civil unions or domestic partnerships as a 
legal alternative.71  But the value of these alternative, quasi-marital 
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relationships is debatable.  For example, Thomas Stoddard and Paula 
Ettelbrick, both of whom were at one time associated with the Lambda 
Legal Defense Fund, engaged in a famous debate about whether gays and 
lesbians should seek the right to marry.72  Their debate centered on the issue 
of whether gay and lesbian couples should strive to enter into marital 
relationships (Stoddard’s position), or whether the category of marriage is 
adverse to the interests of gay and lesbian couples (Ettelbrick’s claim).  
Fineman’s reforms, however, would render such debates unnecessary.  Her 
reforms do not recognize marriage in the first place, let alone address 
whether the right to marry should be a central goal of the gay rights 
movement.73 
In Fineman’s model, the state cannot regulate who can marry, which 
means the state has no legal interest in supporting one form of marriage 
over another.  Moreover, there are no legal incentives tied to marriage.  
Fineman’s theory essentially knocks marriage off its pedestal74 because the 
state is stripped completely of its power to favor traditional, heterosexual 
relationships over “deviant,” homosexual ones.     
It may be unfair to suggest that Fineman did not consider the impact of 
her reforms on gays and lesbians, even though she does not seem to fully 
embrace the interests of same-sex families.75   Throughout her analysis, 
Fineman frequently differentiates between the idealized family and what 
she calls “deviant” families.  “Deviant” families are those families that are 
“subject to special regulation and control or to a separate, stigmatized set of 
social subsidies, increasingly punitive in nature.”76  Surely gay and lesbian 
families fit within this category: the closest gays and lesbians can come to 
getting married (despite the implications of the recent Massachusetts 
rulings) is entering into a civil union or a domestic partnership, both of 
which are a form of stigmatized, “special regulations.”77   
Fineman does, however, unequivocally endorse the abolition of legal 
marriage as a source of social equality for all sexual relationships. 
Fineman’s theory would likewise counteract the need for alternative, quasi-
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marital relationships like domestic partnerships or civil unions because 
abolishing marriage would free gays and lesbians from the need to pursue 
these alternatives.78  According to Fineman, “[i]nstead of seeking to 
eliminate [the stigma of ‘deviance’] by analogizing more and more 
relationships to marriage, why not just abolish the category as a legal status 
and, in that way, render all sexual relationships equal with each other and 
all relationships equal with the sexual?”79  That said, I must stress that I am 
inferring this argument from Fineman’s theory.  While Fineman does 
undeniably contend that the elimination of marriage will eliminate the 
stigma of deviance, she does not take the opportunity to fully bridge the 
claims between same-sex and heterosexual families.  From a gay rights 
perspective, it is striking that Fineman did not take the extra step to 
affirmatively state the case for same-sex families, which leads one back to 
my earlier discussion of heterosexism and compulsory heterosexuality.80 
B.  The Mother/Child Dyad and Gay and Lesbian Adoption 
Aside from questions of custody (or visitation)81 and surrogacy,82 gays 
and lesbians who wish to be parents currently face two major legal 
impediments to adopting children.  The first (and more blatant) legal barrier 
is state laws that bar same-sex adoptions.83  The second major legal 
impediment is second-parent adoption.84  Fineman’s framework, if 
implemented, would not only make it easier for gays and lesbians to adopt 
children, but it would equalize the status of heterosexuals and homosexuals 
when it comes to adoption. 
The outright ban on homosexual adoption is inconsistent with a main 
principle of Fineman’s theory—namely, that the state should not have the 
power to regulate sexual relationships.85  The purpose of Fineman’s re-
visioned family law is to switch the state’s focus from sexual relationships 
to dependent care.86  Thus, the state could not forbid gay men and lesbians 
from adopting based solely on sexual orientation. 
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Similar reasoning supports the conclusion that the Mother/Child Dyad 
would make it harder for courts to prevent gays and lesbians from adopting.  
For instance, Fineman’s model undermines the crux of the per se rule 
prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting87 because it switches the focus 
of the law from the parents’ relationship with each other to their 
relationships with the child.88  And the creation of the Dyad, in conjunction 
with the abolition of marriage, negates the argument that a same-sex 
environment would not be in the best interests of the child because a 
parent’s sexual orientation would simply not be relevant to the analysis.89   
Likewise, the case for second-parent adoption rights seems stronger 
within Fineman’s model.  In fact, the argument in favor of allowing gays 
and lesbians to adopt is strengthened by the role that contract law plays in 
Fineman’s framework.  The pre-relationship contract would, in theory, 
include provisions for the possibility of raising children.  Thus, the state 
would have no reason to terminate the first parent’s parental rights upon 
adoption by the second parent.   
For example, imagine that two men, Harry and Mitchell, want to enter 
into a binding contractual relationship and that Harry adopted a child before 
he met Mitchell.  Currently, depending on which state Harry and Mitchell 
live in, Mitchell may not be able to adopt the child because his adoption 
would terminate Harry’s parental rights.90  In Fineman’s construct, 
however, Harry and Mitchell may contract the terms of their union at the 
beginning of their relationship, including their respective obligations to the 
child.  Moreover, either Harry or Mitchell (or both, if they wish) can 
contractually agree to be the child’s “mother.”  Fineman’s theory 
successfully eliminates the legal hurdle presented by second-parent 
adoption.  There is, furthermore, an apparent relationship between adoption 
and the Mother/Child Dyad.  For gay men (as opposed to lesbians who can 
be artificially inseminated), adoption is often the only way for them to 
become parents.91  The Dyad would act as a vehicle for securing parental 
rights for gay men, including both single and second-parent adoption. 
Exclusionary Equality and the Case for Same-Sex Families   519 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004 
IV. FITTING THE REWORKED THEORY INTO THE LARGER DEBATE 
OVER SAME-SEX FAMILIES 
The purpose of this article, in addition to discussing the application of 
Fineman’s theory to gay and lesbian families, is to articulate an original 
perspective to add to the larger debate over gay and lesbian families.  To 
meet that end, this section will discuss briefly two issues that are raised by 
the preceding discussion.  First, I would like to better define this article’s 
conception of equality.  The above analysis asserts that Fineman’s theory is 
virtually ideal for gays and lesbians because it treats heterosexuals and 
homosexuals on equal grounds.  Thus, it seems necessary to define how the 
article conceives of equality. 92  Second, I would like to address two 
possible counterarguments that one could reasonably raise in response to 
this article’s thesis. 
A.  Exclusionary Equality 
This article has argued that Fineman’s theory would greatly improve the 
legal standing of gays and lesbians in terms of marriage and adoption 
because it would treat all people equally, regardless of sexual orientation.  
Thus, this article reformulates Fineman’s theory to express it as an equality 
model, as opposed to, say, a moral theory.93  This conception of equality is 
not as simple as the traditional, or inclusive, equality argument.94   The 
traditional equality argument, which is rooted in liberalism, relies primarily 
on the notion that all couples are entitled to marry regardless of sexual 
orientation, and that this equality brings with it the ability for couples to 
choose to marry.95  This argument is based on the belief that heterosexuals 
and homosexuals are entitled to have the same rights, and that the state 
should not exclude either group from exercising the right to marry.  The 
state is capable of granting this right without addressing the morality of 
same-sex unions.96  Fineman’s model, however, does not treat these groups 
as mutually entitled to the rights associated with legal marriage.   
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Fineman believes that an individual’s sexual orientation is simply beyond 
the scope of the law, which stops at protecting a family’s dependents.  
Because neither heterosexuality nor homosexuality is relevant to this aim, 
Fineman’s framework maintains that society should equally exclude legal 
protection for both classes of people.97  Queer theory, which asserts an 
autonomous view of sexuality separate and distinct from gender,98 is 
instructive here.  Building on the idea that sexual classifications are socially 
constructed,99 queer theory posits that the states take on a stricter role in 
regulating “unnatural” sexual classifications.100  It is for this reason that 
queer legal theorists advocate for limited regulation of sexuality, or for none 
at all.101   
Similarly, Fineman’s model advocates what one could call a 
“desexualized” notion of equality.  Whereas the traditional notion of 
equality equates homosexuals and heterosexuals on the grounds that 
sexuality should not prevent either group from living full lives with full 
rights, Fineman’s model suggests that sexuality should not be factored into 
state delegation of rights at all.  Although ostensibly similar, I conceive of 
the traditional argument as an inclusive model of equality, whereas the 
latter conception is more of an exclusive model.  To understand the 
difference between the two, consider a vertical continuum: 
 






   No Legal Rights 
 
This continuum displays a framework for understanding how groups 
possess legal rights.  A group at the top of the continuum would possess full 
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rights, whereas a group closer to the bottom would possess fewer rights.  
The arrow represents the notion that social change, defined as a 
marginalized group gaining legal rights, favors vertical growth on the 
continuum.  Here, we are concerned with the legal rights to marry and 
adopt.102  With these two rights in mind, heterosexuals are clearly at the top 
of the continuum because, without delving into the various subtleties and 
exceptions in certain states, heterosexuals are not barred from the right to 
marry or adopt a child simply because of their status as heterosexual.  On 
the other hand, homosexuals are positioned more toward the bottom of the 
continuum because in nearly every jurisdiction they are, as a class, 
prohibited from marrying.103 Additionally, certain states make it more 
difficult for gays and lesbians to adopt.104  The traditional notion of equality 
is consistent with this continuum’s framework, because it effectively tries to 
raise homosexuals up to the equivalent of heterosexuals by granting 
homosexuals access to the same rights that heterosexuals already possess.  
Thus, the traditional notion of equality seeks to move homosexuals up to the 
position of heterosexuals on the continuum by way of inclusion and 
assimilation to the dominant group. 
By desexualizing family law, Fineman’s model rejects upward movement 
as the end goal of the search for equality.  Instead, Fineman’s framework 
urges that the law should not take a person’s sexual orientation into account 
when it is delegating marital and parental rights.  Rather than raising 
homosexuals up on the continuum, Fineman’s model would lower 
heterosexuals down to the equivalent of homosexuals at the bottom of the 
continuum.105  Because it excludes any question of sexuality when it 
considers the distribution of legal rights, Fineman’s model is, therefore, a 
more exclusive model of equality.106  This, at least in theory, reverses 
common conceptions of equality-driven arguments.   
For instance, Fineman’s model is not consistent with a standard equal 
protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, where plaintiffs 
normally challenge classifications on the grounds that they restrict a class’s 
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access to certain rights,107 not that no one is entitled to the right in 
question.108  Instead of targeting a specific group or making group-based 
classifications,109 Fineman’s framework rejects all sex or gender 
classifications when delegating rights, turning its focus solely to questions 
of dependency.  That is, to equalize homosexuals and heterosexuals, 
Fineman’s model excludes any question of sexual classifications—hence, 
exclusive rather than inclusive equality. 
B.  A Counterargument or Two: Identity and Morality 
This section addresses briefly two likely counterarguments to the above 
analysis.  The first critique focuses on the effect of Fineman’s theory on the 
political identity of gays and lesbians, whereas the second critique points to 
the failure of this article to address the moral question regarding same-sex 
families.  Although this article only touches on these issues briefly, it is 
important to note that these issues are complex and deserve further 
discussion.   
1.  The Gay Identity Question 
Paula Ettelbrick maintains that gays and lesbians should not seek to be 
treated equally because equal treatment compromises the intrinsic value of 
being a member of a different social group.110  One major weakness of 
Fineman’s theory as applied to gay and lesbian families, then, is that the 
equality the theory seeks will deprive gays and lesbians of their outsider 
status because it will treat gays and lesbians as if they were the same as 
heterosexuals.111  Indeed, Nancy Polikoff has argued that, by its nature, 
marriage is “an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society,”112 and 
that this leads gays and lesbians to abandon any hope of homosexual 
liberation.113   
This criticism of marriage seems likewise applicable to Fineman’s model 
because her theory would eliminate the different treatment of heterosexuals 
and homosexuals when it comes to forming families.  It may not be 
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necessary, however, to debate this issue at length.  The obvious retort to an 
Ettelbrick-like criticism is that mere equality will not automatically translate 
into depriving homosexuals of their outsider status.114  Ettelbrick’s position 
requires that different groups seek out different treatment, or, at the least, 
that minority group’s position themselves to be able to assert their 
differences.115  Fineman’s model, in its most foundational sense, seeks to do 
the opposite: to remove the legal and social differences between traditional 
and “deviant” groups.  It is enough to say, however, that some members of 
gay and lesbian communities may reject my application of Fineman’s 
theory (or of any equality theory at all, for that matter) by arguing that it 
ignores the inherent value in identifying as a minority group.116 
2.  The Morality Critique 
A second critique of my analysis could likely be made on moral grounds, 
highlighting the failure of Fineman’s theory to address the morality of 
same-sex unions and families.117  By desexualizing the law and embracing 
state neutrality, so goes the argument, the exclusionary equality model does 
not promote the claim that gays and lesbians should live fully human lives 
and this is, a critic could argue, a case of moral bracketing.118   
Generally speaking, moral bracketing is the tendency of political 
philosophers to “sidestep” issues of morality.119  The gay rights movement 
has, to a great extent, relied on the morally-neutral principles of equality 
and privacy rather than moral claims.120 An increasing number of scholars, 
however, are embracing moral claims over the equality and privacy-driven 
arguments of the past.  But embracing a neutral equality argument does not 
necessarily negate the moral claim; certainly there is room for the two to 
overlap and coincide.121 And Fineman’s theory brackets all morality, not 
just the morality of same-sex families.  One can argue that the morality of 
same-sex families is not necessarily trumped in this situation because an 
exclusionary equality argument rejects all morality-based arguments and 
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does not only bracket the morality of gay rights.  Nevertheless, the morality 
critique is well taken, and it also warrants further discussion.122 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In The Neutered Mother, Professor Martha Fineman articulates a re-
visioned family law, proposing radical legal changes that would replace 
marriage with a protected class for nurturing units.  Although theoretically 
feminist in its origins, Fineman’s framework is highly relevant in the 
context of gay and lesbian marriage and adoption.  As applied to these 
issues, Fineman’s theory raises interesting questions as to how the law 
should address gay and lesbian families.  Moreover, one can argue, as I 
have done, that gays and lesbians (and all other champions of same-sex 
families) should consider raising arguments that address the exclusionary 
aspects of equality. 
My analysis is not meant to be exhaustive; it may be impossible to make 
a substantial dent in any of the issues raised in this piece.  Nevertheless, 
scholars should continue to address the relationship between feminist 
thought and gay and lesbian studies, for it is crucial that we address both the 
normative and descriptive questions regarding homosexuality and the law.  
Currently, gays and lesbians face numerous hurdles in forming legal 
families.  To overcome these hurdles, it is essential that we consider the 
legal characteristics of sexuality.  Perhaps, indeed, Martha Fineman’s work 
in family law provides a starting point for this process. 
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many years) is not all that different from the discussion of mothers and caretakers here. 
58 For an example of theory imitating pop culture, one can find a similar situation on the 
television show Will and Grace.  There, two friends, a gay man and a straight woman, 
decided that they would raise a child together.  See Will and Grace, A.I.: Artificial 
Insemination (NBC television broadcast, May 16, 2002).  Fineman’s theory would 
embrace such a scenario. 
59 I do not mean for my succinctness to suggest that Fineman’s theory is entirely without 
flaws, and nor do I mean that it is riddled with flaws, either.  My hope in this article is to 
not focus too much on the weaknesses of Fineman’s model, but to show how advocates 
of same-sex families can rework and utilize her theory to champion same-sex families.   
See infra Part II.C (criticizing Fineman’s theory). 
60 While this article is technically not a book review, it most definitely shares aspects of 
a book review in that it addresses and reworks a theory from one specific book.  And 
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while my defense of Fineman’s theory is apparent, I must, to fully embrace this article’s 
similarities to a book review, also present a brief criticism.  For a similar discussion of 
the proper role of a book reviewer, see John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A 
Review of Richard Posner’s The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (discussing how a book review should present both objective and 
critical analysis, so that a reader can determine whether she wants to read it); Richard A. 
Posner, On the Alleged ‘Sophistication’ of Academic Moralism, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1017 
(2000). 
61 I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 
1159 (1991). 
62 Capers calls this the “binary gender system.”  Id. at 1159. 
63 Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
187, 195. 
64 See generally Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 
SIGNS 631 (1980).  Rich’s article also discusses what she calls the “lesbian continuum,” 
which theorizes that all women rely on and have a series of female relationships that are 
not solely sexual in nature.  See generally id. 
65 SONYA ANDERMAHR ET AL., A CONCISE GLOSSARY OF FEMINIST THEORY 34 (1997). 
66 For one of the first feminist works recognizing the inextricability of racism, sexism, 
and homophobia, see AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 110–13 (1984). 
67 For a comprehensive discussion of the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation, see Francisco Valdes, Queers, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and 
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (displaying in great detail the ways in which the law 
conflates these three categories). 
68 See generally, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, 
Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 
(1988); see also KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 14, 53–71 (outlining 
the sex discrimination argument and assessing the leading objections to it). 
69 Professor Fineman may be surprised to see that I have characterized her theory as an 
equality model because she has been critical of the equality model in the past.  See, e.g., 
Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 
VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995) (arguing that gender-neutral locution of modern family law has 
not improved the legal and political standing of women in society). 
 This raises an important question: considering that Fineman primarily rejects equality 
arguments, how can one characterize her theory as an equality model?  My answer, which 
I hope is sufficient, is that Fineman’s rejection of the equality model is a rejection of 
equality vis-à-vis men and women—namely, because the equality framework has hurt 
married and divorced women.  The discussion of equality in this article is focused on 
equalizing heterosexuals and homosexuals, not men and women. That is, this article 
asserts that Fineman’s re-visioned family law is, implicitly, an equality model, and that 
Fineman’s rejection of equality as a beneficial model for heterosexual women does not 
discount the possibility that her theory may, in effect, equalize heterosexuals and 
homosexuals. 
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70 See infra notes 2–12 and accompanying text (discussing the recent same-sex marriage 
case and how that case may affect the legal landscape for gays and lesbians).  As I 
mentioned before, this will surely change, but it is simply too early to predict what will 
happen to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts. 
71 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 23 (2000) (providing civil unions for same-sex couples).  
Vermont’s Civil Union legislation is the direct result of the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
decision in Baker v. State, where the court held that the legislature could not limit the 
right to marry to opposite-sex couples.  See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) 
(declaring the state bar on homosexual marriage a violation of the state constitution). 
72 See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation, OUT/LOOK, 
Autumn 1989, at 8–12; Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to 
Marry, OUT/LOOK, Autumn 1989, at 8–12. 
73 Fineman’s reforms would render a great deal of precedent obsolete.  In 1993, for 
instance, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state’s restriction against same-sex 
marriage was unconstitutional under the state constitution.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 
(Haw. 1993).  In response, however, the state passed a constitutional amendment against 
recognizing same-sex unions.  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the 
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  Following this amendment, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court had no choice but to reverse the previous holding in Lewin.  
Baehr v. Miike 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). 
74 I borrow this term from Judge Posner’s discussion in Irizarry v. Board of Education of 
the City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001).  In that case, Milagros Irizarry, a 
heterosexual woman who had lived with the same man for more than twenty years and 
had two children with him, challenged the Chicago Board of Education’s School policy 
to only provide domestic partnership benefits to the partners of homosexual employees.  
For the discussion of Lambda’s role, see id. at 608–09.  Posner went on to suggest that 
Lambda Legal was trying to know marriage of its perch.  Id. at 609 (“Lambda wants to 
knock marriage off its perch by requiring the board of education to treat unmarried 
heterosexual couples as well as it treats married ones, so that marriage will lose some of 
its luster.”). 
75 See infra Part II.C (criticizing Fineman for the hetero-centricity of her theory). 
76 FINEMAN, supra note 28, at 227. 
77 Massachusetts may soon provide for same-sex marriage; however, at the time of this 
writing, it was unclear whether the legislature would put a halt to same-sex marriage in 
the state.  See infra notes 2–12 and accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts 
opinions and how the legislature is considering a marriage amendment to the state 
constitution). 
78 For both an extensive discussion of same-sex unions and an ethical argument in favor 
of supporting same-sex families, see RICHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION: 
WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS (1994). 
79 FINEMAN, supra note 28 at 230. 
80 See infra Part II.C (discussing heterosexism and Fineman’s failure to adequately 
defend against such discrimination). 
81 The literature on visitation custody in same-sex families is vast—and seemingly 
beyond the scope of the article.  For a detailed treatment of custody and visitation issues 
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in same-sex families, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, 
GENDER, AND THE LAW 828–41 (1997).  Nevertheless, an interesting issue raised in 
custody and visitation cases is whether a court can bar a homosexual parent seeking 
custody on the grounds that the parent’s homosexuality will stigmatize, and therefore 
harm, the child.  See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (reasoning that the stigma 
of homosexuality will harm the child). 
82 For a discussion of surrogacy, both in context of homosexuality and in the 
heterosexual context, see generally Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy—
Unfinished Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775 (1993); Christine L. Kerian, 
Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of 
Women’s Bodies and Children, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113 (1997); Angie Goodwin 
McEwan, Note, So You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: Economics and Exploitation 
in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271 (1999). 
83 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997) (“No person eligible to adopt 
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”).  As discussed earlier, the 
Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of this provision.  See Lofton v. 
Sec. of Dep’t. of Children and Family Servs., No. 01-16723, 2004 WL 161275 (11th Cir. 
Jan. 28, 2004) (upholding, on constitutional grounds, Florida’s law banning homosexuals 
from adopting). 
84 Second-parent adoption concerns the problem of how a gay partner can legally adopt 
his or her partner’s child without terminating the first parent’s parental rights.  For a 
general discussion of the legal problems associated with second-parent adoptions, see 
Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (2000). 
85 Although Fineman does not discuss the issue of harmful relationships, I think it is a 
safe assumption that she would permit the state to regulate certain sexual relationships 
that prove harmful to children.  For example, the state could presumably regulate a 
couple that openly performs sadomasochistic acts in front of their children, but the state 
would probably not be able to regulate two consenting adults engaging in sadomasochism 
otherwise.  For a brief discussion of law and sadomasochism, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 259–63 [hereinafter 
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] (discussing how the law conceives of sadomasochistic acts). 
86 This raises a further question, concerning the constitutionality of a law that prohibits 
gays and lesbians from adopting.  One of the main things to take away from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is that morality is an insufficient rationale to justify 
a law criminalizing consensual, noncommercial sexual relations between adults.  See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).  Assuming both that we can take the Court’s 
morality holding seriously and that it applies to other contexts beyond sodomy laws, one 
could argue that Lawrence upends a state’s morality-based justification for preventing 
homosexuals from adopting.  At the time of this writing, it is too soon to see how the 
effects and implications of Lawrence will play out.  Presumably, however, both scholars 
and courts will weigh in on the specific question of how the decision affects other, non-
sodomy laws. 
87 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 81, at 843 (“The Per Se Immoral Argument.  In 
a few states, adoption by gay people is substantially or wholly forbidden on the old 
‘immorality’ ground.”). 
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88 Eskridge and Hunter also raise the question, hinted at above in connection with the 
brief discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, of whether such a ban is constitutional in light of 
Romer.  Id. at 844.  Again, I think Lawrence makes an even stronger argument that such 
laws are now unconstitutional. 
89 The data on the question of whether parents’ sexual orientation is harmful to children 
is vast and, at the same time, inconclusive.  Two sociologists, however, have recently 
shown in a meta-analysis that, among other things, children raised in same-sex families 
express nontraditional gender roles.  See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does 
the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AMER. SOC. REV. 159 (2001).  This 
finding, however, can cut either way with those who oppose same-sex families arguing 
that any gender role expression inconsistent with traditional roles would be harmful and 
those who support same-sex families arguing the opposite: that children expressing 
nontraditional gender roles is, in fact, a positive thing.  For a discussion of the Stacey and 
Biblarz article and the argument that their findings should be considered in a normative 
discussion of the value of nontraditional gender roles in children, see Carlos A. Ball, 
Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 
CAP. U. L. REV. 691 (2003). 
90 For an overview of laws regarding second-parent adoption, see Jane S. Schachter, 
Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent 
Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933 (2000). 
91 See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian 
Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 532–42 (1999) (discussing the 
various approaches gays and lesbians have taken in stretching their rights under adoption 
laws, including artificial insemination by lesbians).  As discussed above, surrogacy is 
another option for gay men to create a family.  See articles cited supra note 82 (covering 
the legal issues surrounding surrogacy). 
92 A disclaimer is appropriate here.  My use of the term “equality” is meant more in legal 
terms rather than philosophical terms.  It is likely that most would consider any 
consideration of the scope of equality to be a philosophical discussion.  Not being a 
philosopher myself, I will not attempt to engage in such a discussion, but instead I will 
label this discussion as one of legal theory.  For general guidance on the subject (or on 
this subtle distinction), I refer to Richard Posner’s Overcoming Law.  There, he seems to 
contrast legal theory with philosophy more generally.  “‘Legal Theory’ is the body of 
systematic thinking about (or bearing closely on) law to which non-lawyers can and do 
make important contributions, and which lawyers ignore at their peril.”  RICHARD A. 
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, vii (1995).  Compare this with: “But none of these 
concessions . . . to philosophy’s importance implies that philosophical texts can fruitfully 
be minded for, or philosophers fruitfully consulted on, specific solutions to specific 
problems of social governance.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, What Are Philosophers Good 
For?, in OVERCOMING LAW 446 (1995) (emphasis in original).  Hopefully, my 
discussion of equality will prove helpful in at least some practical application. 
93 Nor are liberality and morality the only potential foundations for a theory of sexuality.  
For instance, Judge Posner has espoused an economic theory of sexuality, which 
contrasts sexual benefits, including procreative, hedonistic and sociable benefits, with the 
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costs of sex, including personal, social and search costs.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX 
AND REASON 111–45 (1992). 
 Also, I should note again that I am recharacterizing Fineman’s model as an equality 
argument even though she expressly rejects equality arguments in the case of 
heterosexual relationships.  See supra note 69 (discussing how I am recharacterizing 
Fineman’s theory as an equality argument). 
94 For an exposition of the traditional equality argument as it pertains to gay and lesbian 
marriage, see Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbian 
and Gay Men and the Intra-community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
567, 580, 591, 599 (1994–95); see also Polikoff, Read Martha Fineman, supra note 16, at 
167 (referring to Wolfson’s article). 
95 For a discussion of both the scope and history of liberal thought, see JOHN GRAY, 
LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1995). 
96 I make the moral/political distinction here to reinforce the importance of state 
neutrality in Fineman’s theory as it is applied to gays and lesbians.  In Fineman’s context, 
the state is able to delegate political rights without passing moral judgment on the various 
groups (i.e. heterosexuals and homosexuals).  This neutrality is reminiscent of the role of 
the state in John Rawls’ philosophy.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  For a discussion of the 
relationship between these two of Rawls’s works, see Rex Martin, Rawls’s New Theory 
of Justice, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 737 (1994). 
97 I must admit that this proposition is eerily similar to one of the main tenants of queer 
legal theory—namely, to reject state regulation of sexuality.  See, e.g., Laurie Rose 
Kepros, Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory?, 9 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 279, 284–89 (2000) (discussing how queer theory can be applied to legal 
theory and how it can be taught in law schools). 
98 See ANDERMAHR, supra note 65, at 180. 
99 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN 
INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley, trans., 1990) (presenting what most consider the best 
statement of the social constructionist rendering of sexuality). 
100 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 85, at 444 n.1 (“Under th[e] assumption [that 
sexuality is socially constructed] law assumes more critical but also more ambiguous 
regulatory roles.”).  My use of “unnatural,” moreover, is meant to contrast social 
construction from natural classifications.  See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and 
“Sexual Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11 (1995); John M. 
Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994). 
101 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER 
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael Warner ed., 1993). 
102 It seems necessary for purposes of this article to ignore the various permutations of 
state adoption laws.  For an overview of current state adoption laws, see Lambda Legal’s 
Overview of State Adoption Laws, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/issues/record?record=5 (last visited Mar. 15. 2004). 
103 Congress’s passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) solidifies the states’ 
ability not to recognize same-sex marriages.  See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered section of 1 & 28 
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U.S.C.).  There remains, however, a question of the constitutionality of DOMA: whether 
DOMA violates the Full, Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV.  For a discussion of this 
issue, see Brett P. Ryan, Love and Let Love: Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and 
Future, and the Constitutionality of DOMA, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 185 (2000); Mark 
Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages and 
Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307 (1998); Timothy Joseph 
Keefer, Note, DOMA As A Defensible Exercise of Congressional Power Under the Full-
Faith-and-Credit Clause, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635 (1997). 
 For an interesting account of the use of narrative in the Congressional debate over 
DOMA, see Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of 
Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998).  
Moreover, a related issue emerging out of Vermont’s civil union law is how other state 
courts should deal with gay divorces.  For a narrative discussion of this problem, see 
Laurie Essig, My Gay Divorce, LEGAL AFF. Sept.–Oct. 2003. 
104 Without considering the states’ various attitudes toward second-parent adoptions, 
there are numerous states that make it hard for a same-sex couple to adopt, but only 
Florida expressly prohibits homosexuals from adopting.  See FLA. STAT. ANN 63.042(3) 
(West 1997) (prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children). 
105 In fact, if you want to be technical about it, Fineman’s model would not just lower 
heterosexuals down on the continuum.  Rather, she would lower both heterosexuals and 
homosexuals down to the lowest possible place. 
106 Exclusion is significant, moreover, because it removes the question of morality from 
the debate.  Because the state is blind to questions of sexuality, gays and lesbians would 
not be faced with defending themselves against the argument that they are morally 
deficient and therefore not entitled to equal access to the good.  Admittedly, this flies in 
the face of Professor Ball’s argument against moral bracketing.  See CARLOS A. BALL, 
THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2003) 
[hereinafter BALL, MORALITY] (arguing that gays and lesbians should embrace a moral 
argument rather than bracketing the question of morality and arguing for rights on other 
grounds). 
107 For instance, take the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) litigation.  United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  There, female plaintiffs challenged the VMI’s all-male 
policy.  The crux of their argumentwas that women, as a class, were equally entitled to 
the educational value of the VMI experience.  That is, they were seeking equality through 
inclusion, not through exclusion. 
108 To mention this is not to raise the unanswered question from Romer of whether 
homosexuals constitute a suspect class for purposes of a constitutional analysis, which 
remains unanswered in light the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in Lawrence v. 
Texas.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
109 See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, Constitutional Law and Equality, in A COMPANION 
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 156 (Dennis Patterson, ed. 1996). 
110 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing Ettelbrick’s argument).  
Professor Polikoff has similarly argued that gays and lesbians should not seek equal 
marriage rights.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing 
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
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Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993) [hereinafter Polikoff, Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage]. 
111 Although Ettelbrick and Polikoff’s critique is framed in political terms, one could also 
frame this criticism in moral terms, reasoning that Fineman’s model is deficient because 
it fails to address head on the issue of whether there is an inherent good in the 
relationship between two people of the same sex.  For both a discussion of the issue of 
morality in cases of same-sex marriage and parenting and the argument that we should 
consider morality in the context of same-sex relationships, see BALL, supra note 106. 
112 Polikoff, Gay and Lesbian Marriage, supra note 110, at 1536. 
113 Similarly, the editors of the Harvard Law Review note that by seeking to marry, gays 
and lesbians “legitimate[] state paternalism and the ‘hegemonic’ history of marriage.”  
Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family; Inching Down the Aisle: 
Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and 
Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2010 (2003). 
114 Cf. Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: 
Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or 
Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (arguing, in part, that 
sexuality scholars must move beyond sexual orientation in their quest for social justice). 
115 On the larger question of identity and how groups self-identify, see Martha Minow, 
Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647 (1996).  Questions 
of group identity can be complicated for gays and lesbians.  For instance, lesbian women 
have made pathways within feminist thought to carve out a unique lesbian identity, which 
is, at the very least, facially and particularly different than simply identifying oneself as 
either a woman or a feminist.  See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, supra note 30 (discussing how 
different schools of feminist thought identify and label themselves).  For the larger 
discussion of identity in the gay rights movement, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some 
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth 
Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2159–94 (discussing role of identity in gay rights 
movement). 
116 Philosopher Richard Mohr has written on the topic of the identification of gays as a 
minority.  According to Mohr, “Minority status is a moral vision, and gay studies, as the 
study of a minority, should be viewed chiefly as a normative inquiry rather than as either 
an empirical study of the world or a nonempirical study of discourses.  The normative 
object of any minority study . . . is the social treatment of a group that is socially defined 
independently of the behavior of its members.”  RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: 
OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 252–53 (1992).  In the end, Mohr, like Ball, 
stresses the primacy of morality in gay rights: “[w]e need to be a bit braver and say that 
gay studies matters because gay people matter—here, now, and breathing.”  Id. at 253; 
see also BALL, MORALITY, supra note 106, at 4 (“I believe that many if not most of the 
controversies over homosexuality in our society are at their core appropriately moral 
ones.”) (emphasis in original). 
117 See supra notes 89 & 106 (discussing Professor Ball’s argument that gay rights 
advocates must embrace a moral claim in defense of same-sex families). 
118 See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: 
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997).  According to Ball, 
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[l]iberalism, with its respect for equality, toleration, and state-neutrality, has 
become the predominant theory of political morality of our time.  A central 
component of contemporary liberalism has been to call for a moral bracketing 
in matters of public reasoning; namely, for a strict separation between the 
differing conceptions of the good held by individuals and the broader political 
discourse that seeks to define individual rights and formulate public policy. 
Id. at 1883.  For a similar rejection of moral bracketing, see Chai R. Feldblum, A 
Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485 
(1998) (discussing Ball’s argument and likewise rejecting claims that bracket off moral 
claims by gays and lesbians). 
119 See BALL, supra note 106, at 1–14 (describing, generally, moral bracketing as the 
sidestepping of moral claims in political philosophy, and rejecting the morally-neutral 
privacy and equality arguments that have, until now, been the foundation of the gay rights 
movement). 
120 For instance, the legal theories in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence all relied on privacy, 
equality, or some combination of both.  But all three strayed away from the moral claims 
of which Ball speaks. 
121 See infra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing how I most definitely support the moral claim for 
same-sex families but also want to consider the equality argument rendered in this 
article). 
122 Indeed, I think it worthy of further consideration whether Ball’s moral liberalism 
framework extends beyond the family and into cases of public discrimination, for 
instance, in the case of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.  That question, 
however important it may be, must remain for a later day. 
